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At a time when the law is subject to increasing challenges from 
all sides, it is important to examine the underlying philosophy of the 
legal institution. In doing so, it is equally important to remember that 
the law, as it exists today in Canada, is largely the product ofliberalism, 
and though that ideology is very elastic and flexible, there are other ways 
of understanding the world and thus the law. This paper will examine 
one such alternative: Jewish law, which, though not widespread, has 
endured for three and one half thousand years, and which, through its 
derivative religions, Christianity and Islam, has had a profound effect on 
the thought of a large part of the world. 
In discussing Jewish law from the vantage point of the late 
Twentieth Century, it is necessary to note that while many of the 
concepts in Jewish jurisprudence have parallels in Western legal thought, 
there are also many differences. The very concept of 'law' is one such 
example, and will be discussed in this paper. Further, the concept of the 
state in Western jurisprudence does not really exist at all in Jewish law 
and must for the purposes of comparison, be replaced by related concepts 
such as community or society. 
In addition to these conceptual difficulties, the temporal span of 
the subject must be considered. According to most commonly accepted 
estimates, the Jews began their recorded history early in the second 
millennium B.C.E .. 1 A part of Jewish law thus has its origins in the 
middle bronze age. 2 As might be expected, over the course of so many 
years, the law underwent an umber of changes. It is therefore inaccurate 
to speak of one monolithic corpus of Jewish law. There is an enormous 
volume of Jewish law; the law covers such interesting and relevant areas 
as human rights and the environment. In a paper of this length it would 
be impractical to attempt a synthesis of the subject. Discussion in this 
paper will be limited to an examination of two principal assumptions and 
beliefs underlying Jewish law: the concept of morality and the 
relationship between the law and messianism. 
Throughout its development, Jewish law has demonstrated a 
pre-occupation with morality. It will be shown how this morality has 
developed from a narrow concept to a general one, given to increasingly 
liberal and humanistic interpretations. The relationship between the 
law and messianism, or the idea of human perfection, gives Jewish law 
a characteristic which is alien to liberal thought; unlike Western juris-
prudence, Jews see the law as an agent of human evolution. 
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LAW AND MORALITY 
The word 'Bible' comes from the Greek word for book. In Hebrew, 
the Bible is known as the Tanach , an acronym derived from the Hebrew 
words for its three components, the Pentateuch, Prophets, and Writings. 
The initial 'T', the Torah , or Pentateuch, contains the first five books 
of the Bible. To Jews it is the most important part of the Bible. According 
to the foundation myth of the Jews the Torah was handed down to Moses 
at Mount Sinai. It is significant that the word Torah has simply come to 
mean 'law' in Hebrew. The concept oflaw has been, and is, central to the 
Jewish understanding oflife. It has been suggested that " ... few civiliza-
tions have been so pre-occupied with law as have the Jews". 3 The study 
oflaw is itself, to the Jews, a holy act. There is a legend that even God 
spends one quarter of the day studying the law, and another quarter 
teaching it to children. 4 The importance of the concept of law to the 
Jewish world view is also evidenced in the expression, derived during the 
Jewish people's nearly two thousand years of statelessness, that the Jew 
is at home wherever there is the Torah . 
The centrality of the law in Jewish civilization is related to its 
ubiquity in Jewish life. In contrast, the liberal view of the law is 
essentially negative; the law serves to control human behaviour, to 
prevent Hobbes' "war of every man against every man", or Locke's poor 
state of nature. It serves to protect human life and property so that a 
stable society may emerge and enrich itself. Essential though the law 
may be to the creation of civil society, to the classical liberal philosophers 
it entailed a form of control, a restraint of freedom necessary to limit 
what they considered humanity's destructive and violent impulses. 
Human nature was not only believed to be fundamentally selfish and 
competitive, it was also held to be immutable. Thus the law was not seen 
as a positive good in itself, as it had been for example by Plato, but rather 
as a regrettably necessary institution. Further, because the law re-
strains freedom, it was to be limited to regulating only that which was 
necessary to establish order and protect industry. 5 
In contrast to liberalism, and in agreement with Plato, Judaism 
has always considered the law to be a vehicle toward human fulfillment. 
It is therefore expansive. In addition to the positivist concept oflaw as 
command by the duly constituted ruler backed by sanctions, Jewish 
jurisprudence recognizes morality and intellectual and moral progress 
as law. Under Judaic law, morality is actionable at law. 6 The law is 
a nearly unrestricted term, covering every aspect of human existence, 
not merely to secure life and property, but to "oversee the uses to which 
both are put". 7 Further, human nature is seen as evolving. The law is, 
therefore, not limited to controlling the rougher edges of human behav-
iour, but exists to change humanity and restructure it along lines of 
morality, integrity and fairness. Nor is the goal of the law limited: it is 
perfection. It is perhaps the Jews' single greatest contribution to the 
world that they developed the concept of one God, representing an 
absolute standard of moral and intellectual perfection to which human-
ity aspires, together with the conviction that humanity could, eventu-
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ally, and with much effort, reach that goal. To the Jews, the law is not 
a limiting force, but a liberating one. 
As a result of this view, there is a fundamental divergence 
between Jewish and liberal jurisprudence. Modern jurisprudence, at 
least in its positivist incarnation, allows for the possibility of 'unjust' 
laws, which nevertheless create obligations so long as they are promul-
gated by a legitimate government according to proper procedure. This 
is so because positivist jurisprudence does not recognize morality as law, 
unless it is expressly made so. This is not an acceptable view in Jewish 
jurisprudence; a law is valid only if just, and is only just if it is moral. 
Indeed, there is no separation between the two concepts in Jewish 
jurisprudential writings: 
Judaism regards the law as both the embodiment of the 
good ... and the primary method to inculcate it. What 
emerges within Judaism is a view of the law that gives it 
a central role in both defining the content of morality and 
infusing it into human behaviour. 8 
It is not the legitimacy of the government, nor the procedure followed, 
nor the sanction attached thereto, which creates the obligation, but the 
existence of a moral imperative. Without this imperative, there is no 
obligation to obey beyond the 'mere' avoidance of a sanction or force. 
According to Judaism, an unjust law is no law at all. This fusion oflaw 
with morality has the interesting effect that, unlike under the common 
law, ignorance of the law constitutes a valid defence to a criminal charge. 
An act is generally not considered immoral unless it is done with an 
immoral intention. 
It follows logically that Judaism recognizes the legitimacy of 
civil disobedience and, in fact, considers civil disobedience to be an 
obligation in the face of an unjust law. 9 The Bible applauds civil 
disobedience in several instances, and there are reports by both 
Josephus and Philo of Alexandria of 10 000 Jews staging a 'sit-in' on the 
road from Acre to Jerusalem in 41 C.E. to prevent statues of the Roman 
Emperor Caligula from being installed in the Temple. Incidentally, this 
episode provides an example of a success for Jewish law; the Roman 
commander, Petronius, turned his men back rather than order a slaugh-
ter. 10 
The commitment to morality went so far as to admit of situations 
where even the Jewish law, which itself defined morality, could be 
broken to ensure an even greater moral act. The saving of life, for 
instance, ranks higher than any other law, with the exception of those 
prohibiting murder, adultery, incest and idolatry. Any law outside of 
those four could be broken in order to save a life. 11 Similarly, civil 
disobedience, to the point of risking death, was permitted only to protest 
laws violating the prohibition of murder, incest and idolatry. 12 The 
preservation oflife is considered so important that there is a story that 
God grieves over executed murderers, and even over the Egyptian 
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soldiers whom He drowned in the Red Sea during the flight of the 
Israelites from Egypt. 
The view that true justice must be based on morality, and that 
morality itself can mean even more than what the Jewish law sets out, 
was adopted early on and is included in the Bible. The word 'law' is rarely 
used alone. It is usually accompanied by terms such as 'truth' or 
'righteousness', which emphasize morality rather than 'black letter' 
law. 13 Further,judges were instructed to use equity rather than a strict 
application of the law. Maimonides considered literal interpreters of the 
law to be "poor in knowledge". 14 In fact, the Talmud considered that 
"Jerusalem has fallen (to Rome) because people there adhered strictly 
and rigidly to the Torah rules of law and would not act according to the 
principles of equity" (emphasis added). 15 
SOURCES: NATURAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
Natural Law 
It may be surprising, given the emphasis on morality rather 
than 'law', that there is a controversy in Jewish jurisprudence over 
whether Judaism recognizes a concept of Natural Law, or whether all 
morality comes from God and is therefore positive command. To 
recognize a role for Natural Law is to allow that there is some law which 
exists independently of God, a thought which derogates from God's 
omnipotence. For this reason, Maimonides rejected Natural Law as a 
source of obligation. However, there is a substantial amount of evidence 
supporting the existence of a Jewish Natural Law tradition. Such a 
tradition was recognized by both Hugo Grotius and John Selden in the 
Seventeenth Century. 16 Both referred to the Noachide Code, a list of 
seven commandments given to Noah after the Flood. The first six 
commandments prohibited idolatry, blasphemy, murder, adultery, rob-
bery and the eating of a living animal. The seventh ordered the 
establishment of a court system. 
What removes the Noachide Code from the realm of positive law 
is the fact that it is binding on all nations, not only on the Jews. This is 
not simply because Noah was, in a sense, the second founder of the 
human race, but because these rules are held to be deducible from 
reason. The Talmud states that, among all commandments, these seven 
would have been deduced had they not been commanded.17 For this 
reason, of all Judaism's laws, only these are binding despite ignorance 
of the law on the part of the offender. 18 
Indication of a Natural Law tradition also comes from legend. 
For example, Cain is punished for the murder of Abel, a sanction which 
pre-dates the promulgation of any law. When Cain asks God whether 
he is morally responsible for his brother ("am I my brother's keeper?"), 
the answer is clearly "yes". God's reply indicates a morality pre-existing 
positive law. Nor is God necessarily exempt from the operation of 
Natural Law, at least in general terms. There is a persistent, if 
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unorthodox, tradition in Jewish legend of taking God to court for 
in]ustices committed in the world. Ezekiel and Job both accuse God of 
being unjust and demand that He stop. 19 In a similar manner, 
Abraham denies God the right to be unjust, berating Him with the 
argument "Shall not the Judge of the Earth dealjustly?"20 
The Social Contract 
The dominant body of Jewish law is 'Positive' in thrust. The first 
corpus of law is contained in the text of the Bible, particularly in the 
Torah, which can viewed as the 'constitutional' document of the Jewish 
nation. The Torah contains several legal codes, all claiming divine 
provenance, but shows unmistakable signs of a distinctly human society 
progressing from a "rude and savage" nomadic tribalism to a "refined 
and humane" urban civilization. 21 
There is a parallel here between the Covenant and the remark-
able legal fiction of the social contract. While the two myths are not 
identical (one being a covenant between a nation and God, the other 
between individuals), they are similar in that they ground the origin of 
law in consent, thus giving it a moral force it could not otherwise possess. 
The Jewish covenant with God, however, goes far beyond the scope of the 
social contract. The liberal social contract entailed a limited cession of 
sovereignty from individuals to the state, to the extent necessary for the 
maintenance of public order. The Covenant, agreed to at Sinai, when the 
Israelites accepted the Torah, represents the voluntary commitment of 
a nation to an all-embracing code of behaviour, an absolute standard of 
right and wrong. All of Jewish criminal, contract, tort, property, family, 
business and religious law (save the Noachide Code, whatever concept 
of Natural Law morality is accepted, and the obligation to circumcise 
male children), has its origins within the structure of the Covenant.22 
Given the breadth of the agreement, the Covenant must be understood 
as the adoption of a particular vision of human life and living. It is not 
merely a contract. It is "a paradigmatic statement ... a world view'', 
declaring each covenantor's acceptance that he or she is not an isolated 
individual but a participant in a community involving "a whole host of 
relationships".23 Each covenantor becomes responsible to the commu-
nity for her or his actions, not because this is natural, nor because God 
commands it, but because each person has voluntarily accepted this 
responsibility. It is for this reason that each generation is obliged to act 
as though it has itself come out of Egypt and has been present at Sinai; 
each generation must symbolically re-commit itself to the Covenant.24 
This Weltanschaung is based on a belief which was revolution-
ary at a time when other cultures fatalistically believed that human life 
depended on the whims of capricious gods.25 The covenantal world view 
affirms that humanity possesses free will; we have a choice to do good or 
evil, to act justly or unjustly, and that these choices matter to other 
individuals, and especially to God. What we do and how we behave, is 
considered to effect the very moral order of the world. 26 The Covenant 
thus represents a view in which human beings are important , both 
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individually and in the aggregate, in which the purpose oflife is moral 
and intellectual progress, and in which the goal of human perfection is 
attainable. The Jewish world view rejects both despairing nihilism and 
the liberal conception ofhuman beings as essentially atomized individu-
als. It understands and measures individuals in terms of a series of 
relationships - to other individuals and to all of humanity- and sets this 
against a vision of humanity perfected by adherence to an absolute 
moral order. At the same time, it recognizes the inherent worth of every 
individual as the chooser of her or his own destiny. There may be only 
one proper way to behave, but every person is free to accept or reject that 
path.27 
To speak narrowly of a 'proper way to behave' is, however, 
somewhat misleading in the context of Jewish law. The Torah obviously 
cannot legislate for every conceivable situation. It refers to a great many 
specific situations - tradition recognizes 613 - and contains an array of 
more general guidelines for moral behaviour. The explicit command-
ments presumably are those which were considered to be the most 
important or the most common. Thus, there are specific orders to give 
equal justice to rich and poor, male and female, free person and slave. 
Animals and slaves, as well as the free, are to be rested on the Sabbath. 
Having escaped from slavery in Egypt, the Israelites came to impose 
severe restrictions on that practice. The command to be just to strangers 
is emphasized repeatedly. 28 Strict rules of charity are set out (the 
Hebrew word for charity shares the same root as that for 'righteous-
ness'). 29 A duty to rescue is set out (in contrast to the principle of 
nonfeasance in the common law). 30 Employer/employee relations are 
also considered in some detail (an early form oflabour law). 31 
The most famous and important of the explicit laws are the Ten 
Commandments, which were engraved on Moses' two stone tablets. It 
is significant that the first two commandments deal with the existence 
of God and the prohibition ofidolatry. As indicated previously, although 
the existence of a personal God is stressed throughout the Jewish 
tradition, the concept of God also exists to represent the standard of 
intellectual and moral perfection to which humanity aspires, and which 
the Jews claim as the ultimate end of human existence. Conversely, 
paganism and idolatry represent the negation of such a standard and 
goal. In Jewish thought they symbolize a world view devoid of meaning 
and purpose; they are incapable of inspiring moral progress. 32 In 
addition to their literal meaning, the first two commandments are 
affirmations of the covenantal view of the world- a sort of constitutional 
preamble. The third commandment, to "remember the Sabbath day and 
keep it holy", provides for a weekly re-affirmation of the principles upon 
which the Covenant is based. 
Beyond the Torah's specific commands are provisions such as to 
do "what is right and good", or to "pursue justice". 33 These statements 
ofintent were later stressed by the Biblical prophets during the era of the 
dual monarchy after 925 B.C.E. The prophets emphasized the spirit of 
the Covenant, rather than the 'black letter' law (although they sought 
to return the nation to the Covenant, not abrogate it).34 The prophet 
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Amos declared that God preferred piety to prayer, justice to sacrifice. 
This implied adherence to an even higher standard of behaviour and 
morality than that called for by the Torah's specific commands- a likely 
reason that the prophets were frequently feared and despised by the 
kings and the ruling class of the two Israelite Kingdoms. At the same 
time the prophets served to remind the nation that the commitment to 
morality was permanent: "This is My covenant with them, says the 
Lord ... from this time forth and forever". 35 
In spite of these reminders, it sometimes seemed as though the 
Covenant had been repudiated. In 722 B.C.E., after a three-year siege 
of the capital, Samaria, the northern Kingdom oflsrael fell to Assyria, 
and its ruling, educated class was deported and lost forever. Although 
the southern Kingdom, Judah, survived the Assyrian onslaught, it 
experienced increasingly difficult times after 609 B.C.E .. Caught be-
tween a temporarily resurgent Egypt and the expanding Babylonian 
Empire, the last king of the Davidic dynasty was killed and Jerusalem 
was destroyed in 586 B.C.E. The bulk of the population was deported to 
Babylon, thus removing the quid pro quo of the Covenant: the 
maintenance and protection of the Israelites in their land. The prophet 
Habakkuk expressed incomprehension that the Covenant seemed to be 
broken, "Yahweh, how long shall I cry for help, and thou wilt not hear? 
Or cry to thee, 'violence!', and thou wilt not save?" 36 The prophet 
Jeremiah considered that the Covenant had ceased as the Israelites had 
" ... walked every one after the imagination of his evil heart ... " (he later 
relented and promised a return to the Covenant).37 
For these reasons when, after only fifty years, the Persians 
conquered the Babylonians and allowed the Jews to return to Jerusalem, 
it was believed that in gratitude the Covenant should be renewed. The 
scribe Ezra edited the various legal and historical books which had 
survived, and set out much of what is now the Bible. The Temple was 
rebuilt, though on a much smaller scale, and scholars were sent out to 
teach the law to the people. The Covenant was accepted by a majority 
vote. The people once again bound themselves to it. 38 However, this 
time it was interpreted with subtle differences. Increased exposure to 
outside influences, and the poverty and political insignificance of the 
Jewish vassal province which centered around Jerusalem, led to an 
increased emphasis on the individual's, rather than the nation's, place 
within the moral order. The Covenant was henceforth to be understood 
in a far more personal way than before; the laws considered more 
directly binding on every individual person. 
The books of Job and Ecclesiastes, showing the influence of 
Persian and, especially, Greek thought reflect this change. Both wrestle 
with the problems of suffering and the seeming insignificance of 
individuals. Both end with an affirmation of a duty to live morally. Job 
speaks of God as follows: 
(destroying) both the blameless and the wicked.When 
disaster brings sudden death, He mocks at the calamity 
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of the innocent. The Earth is given over into the hands of 
the wicked; He covers the face of its judges.39 
Nevertheless, Job refuses to "curse God and die". His reason is simply 
stated: "I clothed myself in Justice and it suited me" 40. The lesson of 
Job is clear: every covenanted individual is responsible for adhering to 
the good, despite personal tragedy; every person is responsible for 
contributing to moral progress.41 This too is the lesson of Ecclesiastes, 
an almost existential book which begins with the possibility that life has 
no meaning, but ends affirming that individuals create their own 
meaning by making a conscious choice to pursue, or not to pursue, justice 
and morality. 42 It is this interpretation of the Covenant, developed 
after one period of exile in Babylon, which the Jews carried with them 
into their next period of legal development, at the beginning of a far 
longer exile. 
The Talmudic Period 
Concurrent with the Biblical law, there existed a body of 'Oral 
Law', or custom, which developed over the centuries. So long as the Jews 
were in one area, there was no perceived need to codify this law. Disaster 
prompted codification. The Hasmonean Jewish Kingdom (established in 
165 B.C.E., after a 'war ofliberation' against the Seleucid Greeks who 
had acquired the territory due to Alexander's defeat of Persia) was 
destroyed by civil war and Roman occupation by Pompey in 63 B.C.E .. 
After a three year revolt from 66-70 C.E., Jerusalem was again de-
stroyed, the second Temple burned down, and the legal academies 
restricted. From 132-135 C.E., the Jews staged yet another revolt 
against Rome and this resulted in large-scale massacres and deportations. 
Jerusalem, renamed, Aelia Capitolina, was forbidden to the Jews. 
Under these conditions, it was considered necessary to codify the 
law to ensure its survival. An academy was set up in Tiberias to debate 
the oral law and interpret it in accordance with both the Covenantal 
Code and changed conditions. This was initially done between 90 and 
220 C.E. and resulted in a collection known as the Mishna. Between 220 
and 500 C.E., further discussions and codification took place in both 
Tiberias and in Babylonia (the area known today as Iraq). The codified 
deliberations included majority and minority views on each question, 
and were recorded in two separate collections called the Jerusalem and 
Babylonian Talmuds. They immediately supplanted the Bible as the 
principle legal books of the Jews, thus completing a significant shift in 
Jewish law away from relative legalism based on divine law, towards a 
more liberal interpretation of the law. This was a problem because 
Deuteronomy had specifically commanded that no amendments be 
made to the law.43 The Talmudic academies solved the problem of 
amending the word of God by interpreting archaic provisions out of 
existence, and grafting new concepts onto old laws. 
There arose a remarkable notion in the Talmudic academies 
that human interpretations of the law outweighed divine ones. A story 
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in the Babylonian Talmud relates how several Rabbis were arguing over 
the correct interpretation of a particular law. One of them finally called 
on God to testify in support of his interpretation, to which the others 
replied that "the law is not in heaven: it has been handed down to us at 
Mount Sinai, and we no longer take notice ofheavenly voices ... decisions 
are to be taken by majority vote". 44 This rather aggressive affirmation 
of human precedence completed the transformation of the law from a 
divine to a human institution which had begun nearly immediately after 
Sinai, had gathered pace after the return from Babylon, and, particu-
larly after direct contact with the Greeks, had been established with 
Alexander's defeat of Persia. 45 
This coup d'etat enabled the Talmudic academies to diminish 
the effect of strict law when it was incompatible with equity. They wrote 
that "the courts may intercede in instances where the actions of one 
party, while superficially legal... border on the callous and inhumane".46 
In 'seizing' the ultimate interpretive power, the academies gave courts 
the authority to substitute some Biblical commandments for others in 
their adjudications. The legal fiction of substitution held, for example, 
that a person who acted with humility could be considered as having 
performed the sacrifices at the Temple, an act incapable of fulfillment 
given the destruction of the Temple. Using the same doctrine the Talmud 
equates the honouring of evil with idolatry.4 7 These developments 
stressed behaviour over ritual. 
Many archaic laws were changed at this time. The death 
penalty, specifically mandated in the Torah for thirty-six crimes, 
including failure to respect one's parents, was virtually eliminated 
through a creative manipulation of the rules of evidence, which required 
a nearly impossible combination of proof before allowing a court to 
impose it. The Mishna considers it to be a harsh excess for a court to 
impose the death penalty, even once in its seven year term. The minority 
view goes so far as to suggest that the punishment be meted out" ... every 
seventy years". 48 The Lex Talionis,- an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth-
which, ironically, was originally meant to restrict unlimited revenge 
feuds, was also believed to be excessive and was reinterpreted to mean 
the monetary value of a tooth, eye or life. 49 Without enumerating all 
of the changes made to the law during the Talmudic Period, it is 
sufficient to stress that as a rule, general principles of morality were 
applied to legal cases, so that, in modern terminology, equity became the 
rule and strict application of the law the exception. The Talmud approv-
ingly quotes Hillel, considered the greatest Rabbi of all (and, according 
to modern scholarship, a possible influence on, if not actual teacher of, 
Jesus), 50 as saying that all of Jewish law consists of only one basic rule: 
"Do not unto others as you would not have them do unto you: that is the 
law. All the rest is explanation". 51 
The Post-Talmudic Period: the Commentaries 
Since the close of the Talmudic period, change in the law has 
been achieved chiefly through the use of 'Commentaries' - scholarly 
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explanations of Talmudic and Biblical sources. The Commentaries 
continued the movement away from strict application of the law towards 
the principles of the Covenant. The Talmud refers to this as reading 
"within the line of the law"; what we would today call "reading between 
the lines".52 Nachmanides (1194-1270 C.E.) wrote that " ... one should 
do the right and the good in all matters ... beyond the requirement of the 
law".53 The Sixteenth Century Rabbi Joshua Val-Katz went further, 
stating that the judge "must not always decide according to strict Torah 
law ... (but rather) according to principles of equity". 54 
An example of the radical departure from strict Bible law is the 
change in the legal position of women. This position was greatly 
improved under both the Talmudic and the post-Talmudic regimes, 
rising from a position of near-slavery to one closer to, although admit-
tedly not one offull, equality. 55 Under the earliest legal codes, a young 
girl was liable to be sold by her father as a slave. In Jewish law the 
enslaved daughter had to be freed at puberty and she could not be 
maintained in slavery if raped. In the event that she was raped, the 
offender was required to marry her. Although these laws had been 
abandoned long before the advent of the Talmudic period, the Talmudic 
academies nevertheless took steps to provide real protection at law for 
women. They instituted marriage contracts between husband and wife, 
and provided women with automatic liens on their husbands' estates in 
case of divorce. They declared that a man who beat his wife became 
liable to her for damages in case 9f injury. Finally, in the Eleventh 
Century the commentator Gershom'ofMainz prohibited divorce without 
the consent of the woman.56 Though these protections seem weak today, 
they compare rather favourably with comparable legal protections 
existing at those times in most other societies. 
The period of the commentators reached its pinnacle with the 
works of Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 C.E.). A philosopher, legal 
codifier, scientist, writer and personal physician to Saladin in Cairo, 
Maimonides attempted nothing less than the complete harmonization of 
Jewish religion and law with the principles ofreason and the philosophy 
of Aristotle. 57 He identified reason with morality and law, and saw God 
as representing pure reason as well as morality. As he believed that it 
was possible for humankind to reach many of the Torah's conclusions 
about intellectual progress and morality through reason, he contributed 
to Judaism's emphasis on human thought and relations rather than on 
divine contemplation. Although Maimonides never minimized the 
importance of God as a real being, he nevertheless tended to speak of 
"feeding the hungry and clothing the naked" concurrently with, and 
sometimes in the same paragraph as, laws concerning religious ritual, 
on the grounds that the hungry could not contemplate justice.58 As a 
result of his unorthodox methodology he was sometimes accused of 
selectively ignoring certain aspects of the law and of inventing 
rationalizations with no authorities in support of his contentions. Not-
withstanding these accusations, the quality of his work passed into the 
canon of Jewish jurisprudence. The importance of his contribution has 
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been so great that it is said, "from Moses to Moses, there was none other 
like Moses". 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
Law and the Messianic Ideal 
It is evident that Jewish law has a far more active role in Jewish 
life than is allowed by liberal jurisprudence. As the principal agent of 
human progress, the law serves as the link by which human imperfec-
tion is divinely perfectible. Joseph Blenkinsopp has suggested that the 
entire " ... Deuteronomic programme ... (relates) cultic fidelity with the 
task of creating a just society" through proper application of Jewish 
law. 59 
There is also a hierarchy of more limited goals in Jewish law. 
The first, intrinsic to whatever concept of Natural Law is accepted, 
although not explicit in the Covenant, is the necessary ordering of 
human society. This ordering, held to be the result of an innate human 
desire for community, is reminiscent of Aristotle. The law creates 
conditions in which civilized life is made possible. 60 Historically, these 
conditions are situated roughly in the time before the reception of the 
Torah at Sinai. 
The second stage oflegal development is the ordering of society 
"along principles of morality, integrity and fairness". 61 This formula-
tion should be considered in connection with the increasing social and 
political reforms characteristic of the period of the Judges (c. 1200-1010 
B.C.E.) but more particularly of the Monarchy (c. 1010-586 B.C.E.). 
During these stages the full aim of Jewish law becomes apparent. The 
religious-legal duty of the Jews is not just to create a more just society, 
but to create a perfect one, in other words, to reform the world by 
example. This is the meaning of election. Being the 'chosen people' 
entails extra obligations, not rights. 
It must be emphasized that the Jewish messianic ideal is 
fundamentally different from the Christian one; Judaism has no 
concept of Original Sin. The Jew, like the Christian, sees humans as 
created in the image of God. By having eaten from the 'Tree of 
Knowledge' human beings are not, however, born in sin. Rather, we 
have obtained a measure of God's intellect. We are therefore considered 
to be capable of creation as well as destruction, and of choosing between 
the two. This power includes the ability to change, as well as to 
transcend human nature. The first act of Creation aside, humans are 
deemed to be by themselves capable of continuous re-creation. 62 It is 
this ability which renders the moral and intellectual perfection of 
humanity possible. What it is essential to remember is that it is 
humanity which perfects itself. In the Jewish tradition, the messiah is 
a human being, not a divinity, who is to rule on Earth, not in Heaven . 
. What emerges from the philosophy underlying Jewish religion 
and law is a daring goal ofhomotheosis: humanity becoming like God. 
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There is in fact a long tradition in Judaism of competition with God, parts 
of which have been alluded to in the discussion above. Indeed, the very 
name Israel means "to contend with God". The competition is not meant 
to be acrimonious; it is compared to the competition between children 
and parents. 63 In fact, the Bible itself commands us to emulate and 
attempt to become like God: ''You shall be holy, for I, the Lord thy God, 
am holy". 64 The ideal ofhomotheosis is the ultimate goal of Jewish 
religion and law: the creation on Earth of a morally and intellectually 
perfect, creative humanity, living in a perfectly just society, ruled by a 
perfectly just king. 65 The messianic age is therefore not at all a break 
with history, it is simply the end result of human evolution, brought 
about by adherence to Jewish law.66 
The 'State' in Jewish Law 
(a) The Legislative Branch: The concept of the State is not fully devel-
oped in Jewish law. This may partly be a result of the fact that for 
eighteen centuries the Jews had no state of their own. It is also likely 
that in the formative period of the Jewish people it would have been 
considered presumptuous to install a permanently organized human 
government beneath God. The fact that the laws in their origin predated 
the state would have served to diffuse any perceived need for a 
legislative branch of government. In time this situation changed and a 
limited legislative power was granted to the courts, a power rather akin 
to the (undeclared) power of common law courts to 'legislate' changes to 
the common law. Finally, as discussed previously, a large degree of 
legislative power was 'usurped' by the Talmudic academies and their 
successors, the Commentators. 
(b) The Executive: While it was considered necessary to have a govern-
ment strong enough to implement the law, the fear was that a strong 
executive would be tempted to rule in the manner of a despotic monarch 
and would be unconcerned with the law which had been accepted at 
Sinai. This tension was manifest in the reluctance of the prophet Samuel 
to appoint a king when the people demanded one, and in his eventual 
appointment of Saul, who was a shepherd from the smallest and weakest 
of the tribes. The reluctance of the Twelve Tribes to unite under a strong 
executive monarchy was also the primary reason for the breakup of 
David's Israelite Empire after the death of Solomon in 926 B.C.E .. 
In order to prevent the emergence of an excessively strong 
executive, rules were devised to check the power of the king. This led to 
what Chaim Weizman, the first President of the modern state oflsrael, 
called "the mother of constitutional government".67 The king, or in 
several instances the Queen, was bound to obey the Covenant. Not only 
was the sovereign emphatically not above the law, he or she obtained 
legitimacy only insofar as he or she upheld and enforced the covenantal 
laws and standards. King Solomon is supposed to have declared that 
"only by justice is the throne established". 68 
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There existed a list oflegal obligations to guide royal action. The 
Sovereign must be a "man of the people", refrain from keeping too many 
horses, abstain from keeping numerous wives, 69 refrain from accumu-
lating wealth, and read Deuteronomy daily. 70 In addition to legal 
checks, the activities of the monarch were to be checked by the the 
prophets. The prophets were commanded by law to act as consciences, 
or "mirrors to Kings'', praising good acts and publicly criticizing injus-
tice. 71 The moral authority of a constitutional monarch ruling under a 
just Constitution (the Torah) was illustrated by the famous Eighteenth 
Century Rabbi of Berdichev, Russia, who pointed out that despite a huge 
standing army, the living Tsar was unable to prevent smuggling, while 
the Jewish law was still respected by Jews despite the fact that Moses 
had been dead for three thousand years and the Jews stateless for 
seventeen centuries. 72 
(c) The Judiciary: The institution of a judiciary is considered of vital 
importance in Jewish law, more so than the executive. It is believed to 
be so important that it is the seventh and final component of the 
Noachide Code, and is thus binding on all humanity. The great 
commentator Rashi ( 1040-1105 C.E.) considered that although different 
nations established different legal systems, all were required by Natu-
ral Law to establish court systems to enforce equitable laws. 73 As noted, 
there is little legislative power under Jewish law. It is the courts which, 
by and large, fulfill the legislative function. The judiciary in its 
application of the law is considered to advance the perfection oflaw. The 
Talmud equates judgeship with the human process of self-creation: 
"Whoever renders a true and just decision, it is as if he had become a 
partner with God in the work of creation". 7 4 
The creation of a sophisticated court system dates to the return 
of the Jews to Israel from Babylon in 444 B.C.E .. A Great Sanhedrin of 
seventy-one judges sitting in Jerusalem operated as the Supreme Court, 
while lesser Sanhedrins were established throughout the countryside 
with the jurisdiction of each level clearly defined. In addition to 
adjudication and reforming the law, the Great Sanhedrin had supervi-
sory responsibilities. Only it could appoint the King, the High Priest, 
and lesser judges. Only it could declare war, barring emergency 
situations of self-defence. It was the Great Sanhedrin, then, which 
replaced the prophets as the counterweight to the power of the Executive 
during the era of the Second Temple. 
( d) Enforcement: The fact that Jewish law regulates nearly every aspect 
of human life, from the largest moral questions to the minutiae of daily 
routine, may render the impression that it tends toward a totalitarian 
control of human life. This is not the case. Many aspects of the law are 
not meant to be enforced. Apart from the practical impossibility of 
enforcement, because the law is equated with morality, it was believed 
that an act could only be moral ifit were done voluntarily and out oflove 
for the law, rather than out of fear.75 Although this does not apply to 
the law as a whole - sanctions are set out for many of the crimes defined 
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in the various legal codes - it has consistently been held that certain 
aspects of the law should not be enforced at all, including beliefin the law 
itself. Unlike in Islam, there is in Judaism no punishment for apostasy. 
"There is no catechism in the Judaic tradition, nor is there any inquisi-
tion into the content or sincerity of the individual adherent's belief'. 76 
Thus, Judaism leaves some matters of morality to the conscience of the 
individual. While in the Ninth Century B.C.E., the Chief Temple Priest 
Jehoiada set guards at the entrance to the Temple to prevent access to 
the 'impure' (unwashed), a Fourth Century scholar cogitates: if"one has 
suffered a pollution ... (and) is so minded, he bathes; if he is otherwise 
minded, he does not bathe. Does anyone see him, or does anyone know 
to tell him he ought?" 77 Similarly, the Sixteenth Century Rabbi, the 
Mahalel of Prague, considers the more substantive issue of freedom of 
speech, in a manner reminiscent of John Stuart Mill: 
Even if one's words are directed against faith and 
religion,do not tell a man not to speak ... Otherwise there 
will be no clarification ofreligious matters ... One should 
tell a person to express whatever he wants. The elimina-
tion of the opinions of those opposed to religion under-
mines religion and weakens it. 78 
The lack of enforcement in many areas of the law underlies a 
major difference between the Jewish and the liberal conception of'law'. 
The liberal view is bound to the concept of rights which are held by 
individuals against other individuals and against the state. The state 
may not make laws which interfere with these rights, and each indi-
vidual has a duty not to exercise her or his rights to the detriment of other 
individuals. This right/duty dichotomy flows from a political and legal 
philosophy which maintains antagonistic views of the relationships 
between individuals, and between individuals and the state. This 
fosters the liberal notion that a law which is considered binding, is only 
law, if it carries with it a sanction for failure to obey. 
The dichotomy between rights and duties does not exist in 
Jewish law. As indicated previously, a law is considered binding only if 
it orders society and contributes to the moral and intellectual progress 
of humanity. There is no perceived conflict between law and freedom. 
The law is held to lead to human freedom, to a moral and intellectual 
perfection approaching Divine stature. Rather than seeking to protect 
individuals from one another and from the state, Judaism considers 
humanity to be joined in a community of individuals sharing a collection 
of interpersonal debts. Jewish law attempts to encourage "impulses to 
co-operation and friendship and not... impulses to assert rights, demand 
duties, and threaten force." 79 Each person is considered to be an 
individual. Each has the free will to cooperate or not to cooperate in the 
building of the community, and each is responsible for that choice, both 
to the community and to God (or, if one prefers, to the common vision of 
what humanity can achieve). 80 In modern terms, Jewish law lies 
somewhere between liberalism and corporatism, or communitarianism. 
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There is no contradiction, within the Judaic tradition, in the fact that a 
law may not be enforced by the state, but may still be binding law. 
The emphasis on the community of all humankind is the essen-
tial reason for obeying the law. It is not the only reason. At a simple level, 
God is said to materially reward those who obey the law. As Meir Tamari 
has pointed out, in a religion with only a weak tradition of an afterlife, 
the sole external reward for virtue has generally been material well-
being (although the reward, of course, depends upon God's will). 81 
Other reasons for adhering to the law range from the basic need to 
maintain order thus making civilized life possible, 82 and to the need to 
maintain the hope of progress in an evil world. 83 
The Jewish foundational myth of election reinforces the impor-
tance of obeying the law. Upon accepting the Covenant, the Jews made 
themselves responsible for upholding the law in order to reform the 
world by example. Human perfection and the just world are only 
possible, though, through the voluntary adherence of individuals to the 
law. Every individual's choice to adhere to or disregard the law therefore 
effects all humanity. While an individual who chooses to adhere to the 
law may not be individually rewarded, humanity as a whole gains. 
Conversely, disobedience of the law 'writ large' is a violation of the 
covenanted individual's duty to advance the standard of absolute moral-
ity. Individuals who choose not to obey the law thereby commit an act 
of destruction, setting the world back towards idolatry and anarchy. 84 
SIGNIFICANCE OF JEWISH LAW 
Jewish law represents a fundamentally different approach to 
life and law than does liberalism. It holds that human beings are 
possessed of free will, capable of both good and evil. It believes that 
humanity is rational and perfectible. It affirms that we cannot conceive 
of ourselves solely as individuals or as members of a group if we are to 
succeed in the realization of 'world community'. In combination these 
tenets represent a cohesive vision which is both optimistic and challeng-
ing. The genius of the institution of Jewish law is the flexible means it 
has implemented in seeking to achieve its absolute and unchanging goal. 
The stress on reasoning and 'principle', as opposed to the 'letter of the 
law', has saved Jewish legal thought from stultifying formalism and 
irrelevance. It was thus possible for Rabbi Simeon b. Gamaliel to write 
of the Talmud that "the world endures by virtue of three things: justice, 
peace and truth" 85, without having to fully define just what justice, 
peace and truth entailed. 
To this writer it appears that Jewish lmv has two advantages 
which, paradoxically, are also disadvantages. The first is that for much 
of its existence, and for nearly the entire period ofits greatest change and 
adaptation, Jewish law did not face the pressure of implementation by 
a state. In its first one thousand years, when the Jewish law did exist as 
the law of a 'nation-state', it was relatively modern in comparison to 
other legal codes of that time. From the Talmudic period onwards, the 
law was applied to a relatively small group of people spread throughout 
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the area of three, and then six continents. As it did not have to face the 
stress of national implementation, it was free to preoccupy itself with 
absolute morality. It did not have to expect human beings, with their 
weaknesses and appetites, to succeed in adhering totally to the law. In 
its broader ambit it emphasized the role of law as a guide to moral 
behaviour, rather than detail a complete civil and criminal code. The .. 
focus of the law became the development and refinement of the means 
towards the end of absolute morality. Jewish law seems to have shared 
the same attitude that Judaism has always had with regards to the 
Messiah: the Messiah will come, certainly, absolutely, but not within 
planning range; we had better begin to learn to live together in the 
meantime. 
The second advantage/disadvantage of Jewish law is that it has 
always applied to a small and relatively homogeneous group of people. 
When Rabbi Simeon b. Gamaliel refers to the abstract notions of justice, 
peace and truth, most Jews .in antiquity would have had a shared 
understanding of the concepts. The holy days established under Jewish 
law reinforce these collective conceptions. Passover, the most significant 
holiday in Judaism celebrates the freedom of the Israelites from slavery 
and their acceptance of the law. The annual requirement in law that 
each Jew recount the story of the Exodus and the reception of the law 
strengthens the bonds to the law and to the community. 86 The 
disadvantage of this is the reduced applicability of that law to those 
outside the group. Ironically, the same elements which bring Jews to 
accept their self-imposed duty to the world also mitigate against the 
applicability of the covenantal world view beyond the group. 
This is not to argue that Jewish law has not had a profound effect 
upon the world. Through its derivative religions, Christianity and 
Islam, Judaism's moral codes are today applied, to a greater or lesser 
degree, over many peoples across the world. Harold Berman and other 
legal scholars have documented the debt that modern Western law owes 
to religion, specifically to Christianity and through it, to Judaism, for 
having provided it with a moral code. Without this, scholars claim, 
Western law would have neither authority nor cohesiveness. 87 
In the end, however, if Jewish law is to be considered anything 
more than a cultural fossil, it must stand on its own rather than be 
respected for its contribution to other legal traditions. Jewish law is 
possibly the first example of a jurisprudential tradition which does not 
accept that human nature is static. Although Plato would concur, his 
opinion was 'lost' to Western philosophy until the writings of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau in the Eighteenth Century. A formidable array of 
thinkers, from Aristotle onwards, including the classical liberals, held 
that human nature was fixed and immutable. While opinions diverged 
as to whether that nature is 'good' or 'bad', the notion of immutability 
necessarily limited the scope of human action. The belief of liberalism 
that human nature will always and fundamentally be self-interested 
and competitive is, in essence, a 'fallen vision'. While no one could deny 
the indisputable success ofliberalism in influencing Western life, it is 
nevertheless true that in its moral outlook, it is rather limited. 
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On the other hand, the lasting legacy of Jewish law is the utopian 
vision of the perfectly just world. Given the sorry state of human affairs, 
particularly in this century, one might conclude that the liberals are 
right and that the idea of a just world is a fallacy. However, Judaism's 
astounding and unshaken faith, in the face of history's dismal record, 
that humanity can reform itself and progress to perfection, and even 
homotheosis, remains strong. In an age of nuclear weapons and wide-
spread human persecution the importance of grounding law in morality, 
truth, and the pursuit of perfection, both in the individual, but more 
importantly in the communal sense, must be reconsidered. It is in many 
ways apt that we, as lawyers, remember the words of the long-dead 
psalmist, who from a distance of 2, 500 years, tells us with absolute 
conviction, that "The law which is perfect, perfects the soul". 88 
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